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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
FRANK GENE POWELL, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously held that State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strict compliance" with rule 11(5), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, test which supersedes the 
"record as a whole" test traditionally applied on review to 
determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on October 
24, 1990, and appears in State v. Powell, No. 900202-CA (Utah Ct. 
App. Oct. 24, 1990) (unpublished) (a copy of the court's opinion 
is contained in the addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 11, 1987 defendant was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 19). On May 20, 1988, an amended 
information was filed charging defendant with manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1990) (R. 81). On the same day defendant pleaded guilty to that 
charge (R. 186). Defendant was sentenced to serve an 
undetermined term of not less than one year or more than 15 years 
at the Utah State Prison (R. 100-02). 
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea (R. 104). A hearing on defendant's motion was 
held on November 3, 1989. The trial court issued a memorandum 
decision denying defendant's motion on March 30, 1990 (R. 168-
78). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 4, 1990 (R. 
179). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 20, 1988, defendant entered a guilty plea to the 
charge of manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). At the hearing on defendant's 
guilty plea the trial judge asked defendant his educational level 
and ability to read and speak the English language (R. 183); 
whether defendant was being treated for any mental illness or was 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol (R. 184); whether 
defendant understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by 
pleading guilty (R. 184); whether he understood the contents of 
the affidavit explaining his rights that he had reviewed with his 
attorney (R. 184); whether anyone had used any force, duress or 
coercion against him (R. 184); and whether defendant considered 
the statement of facts concerning the events giving rise to the 
death in question, as recounted by the county attorney, to be 
true and accurate (R. 185). After defendant answered the 
questions to the trial court's satisfaction, defendant was 
permitted to sign the affidavit, and the court accepted his plea 
of guilty (R. 184-5). The court stated that the plea was a 
result of a plea agreement and that the court had discussed the 
agreement and its circumstances with the county attorney (R. 185-
86). 
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. At the plea hearing defendant 
testified that he did not realize that, by pleading guilty, he 
was giving up his right to trial, to testify and to hear 
witnesses against him (R. 192-94). Defendant also testified that 
he believed he would serve no more than 18 months in prison as a 
result of his plea (195-96). Defendant's trial counsel also 
testified concerning the taking of defendant's plea. He noted 
that he was aware of defendant's limited educational background 
and difficulty in understanding the legal concepts involved in a 
guilty plea (R. 204). As a consequence, trial counsel 
extensively reviewed and, at times, paraphrased the affidavits 
defendant was to sign in conjunction with his plea. (R. 205-06, 
208-18). Included in the review was a discussion concerning 
defendant's sentence, counsel's assessment of the time he thought 
defendant would spend in prison, and the trial court's absolute 
prerogative in imposing sentence (R. 212-14). Trial counsel 
firmly believed that defendant understood exactly the rights he 
was waiving and the penalties that attached to a plea (R. 208). 
In denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the trial court, applying the "record on a whole" standard, 
found that defendant's motive for moving to withdraw the plea was 
"buyer's remorse" resulting from his failure to gain parole in 18 
months (R. 177). He concluded that defendant understood his 
guilty plea and its consequences (Ld.). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987), 
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST 
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
On appeal to the court of appeals, defendant claimed 
that he did not fully understand the effects of his plea and the 
various constitutional and statutory rights he was waiving. 
However, defendant did not specify what "effects" he did not 
understand or what constitutional and statutory rights he did not 
know he was waiving. Instead, defendant relied upon an on-the-
record "strict compliance" with rule 11 argument to urge reversal 
of the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. The State responded that, under the "record as a whole" 
test traditionally applied by this Court on post-conviction 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the record clearly 
supported the trial court's denial of defendant's motion. See, 
e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
110 S.Ct. 751 (1990); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam). 
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea, the court of appeals rejected the State's 
argument, continuing to conclude that this Court in State v, 
Gibbons replaced the "record as a whole" test with a strict rule 
11 compliance test. Powell, Case No. 900202-CA at 2. The court 
of appeals decision misconstrues Gibbons and ignores significant 
language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons opinions of this 
Court. 
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on 
the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the 
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that 
"a statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate." Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312. It then set out the specific requirements for 
taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting 
The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows: 
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is 
not critical so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving. 
718 P.2d at 405. 
_ « ; _ 
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the 
defendant's pleas. Ibid. The Gibbons Court did not even mention 
the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a 
guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not 
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness 
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict 
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons. The Gibbons 
Court simply did not address that issue. 
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a 
whole test was not modified by Gibbons. For example, in Jolivet 
v. Cook, this Court stated: 
We first address Jolivet's claim that his 
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. 
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns 
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas 
because he did not make findings that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how those elements related to the facts, 
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he 
did not know or understand these things when 
he entered his pleas. 
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a 
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must 
find that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he or she is entering the plea. In Gibbons, 
this Court stated that in making this 
finding, the trial court must ensure that the 
defendant understands "the elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In 
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that 
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea, 
it must find that the defendant knows of the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The record clearly shows that at 
the time the guilty pleas were accepted, 
Judge Burns did not make the findings 
required by [rule 11(5)], i.e., that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how these elements related to the facts 
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held, n[T]he absence 
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted). In State v. Copeland, 
the Court, without citing Gibbons, said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173 
(emphasis in the original). We think the 
most effective way to do this is to have the 
defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. We hold that the record 
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts 
sufficient to justify his conviction of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons 
guilty pleas, this Court did not note or attach any significance 
to that fact in either opinion, and, in fact, directly applied 
n 
Gibbons in Jolivet in concluding that although the trial court 
did not strictly comply with rule 11, the record as a whole 
demonstrated that Jolivet entered his guilty pleas knowingly and 
voluntarily. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously 
undermines the court of appeals' effort to distinguish Jolivet 
and Copeland on the basis that the record as a whole test was 
applied in those cases because they involved pre-Gibbons guilty 
9 
pleas. Significantly, in State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 
1989), which involved a post-Gibbons guilty plea, this Court 
appeared to apply the record as a whole test in reversing the 
3 
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw. 
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the 
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction 
attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the 
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986): 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before 
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined 
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that 
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would 
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672 
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of 
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet 
and should not be followed. 
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of 
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in State v. 
Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1990), and 
stating directly in State v. Pharris, Case No. 890549-CA, slip 
op. at 8 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), a case issued after 
Gentry, that Smith applied the "strict compliance test 
articulated in Gibbons.•• 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is shortsighted, for to follow 
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to hold any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendant's, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past, e.g., State v. Knowles, Utah, 
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no 
reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical, if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more that technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
4 
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . In so ruling, this 
4 
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than 
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does 
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived 
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378 
S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989) (where defendant was otherwise 
informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is applied to 
trial court's failure to comply with rule governing taking of 
pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781, 
783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" demonstrated that plea 
was made knowingly and voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 
9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) (voluntariness of plea determined 
by considering all relevant circumstances surrounding it, not by 
judge's ritualistic recitation of rights waived). 
Court adopted the harmless error rule in assessing rule 11 
errors, a rule long recognized by this Court in a variety of 
contexts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989) 
(harmless error standard for nonconstitutional error); State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with respect to 
certain constitutional errors, we must place on the State the 
burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt"). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Interestingly, the court of appeals, while 
attempting to distinguish Kay from the instant case, failed to 
recognize this Court's application of the harmless error rule. 
This was done even though the State cited the foregoing quoted 
language from Kay in its brief. See State v. Powell; Case No. 
900202-CA at 2-3, Br. of Appellee at 10-11. 
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's 
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a 
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance 
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because 
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law 
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(b). Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in 
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court 
of appeals has decided an important question of law which should 
be settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition 
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this fC day of November, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
lis 
1DITH S. H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Stephen 
R. McCaughey, Attorney for Respondent, 72 East Fourth South, 
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Plaintiff and Appellee, 
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Frank Gene Powell, 




J °* ** Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900202-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 24, 1990) 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Bench. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals the trial court's refusal to allow 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant's guilty plea 
to manslaughter was entered on May 20, 1988. He was sentenced 
August 2, 1988. On September 29, 1989, defendant moved to set 
aside the plea. He claims that he did not understand the 
nature and consequence of his plea because his rights under 
Rule 11(5), Utah R. Crim. P. were not adequately explained to 
him. He also contends that his lack of formal education 
precluded an understanding of his plea and the affidavit he 
signed. 
We have reviewed the entire record with respect to 
defendant's entry of his guilty plea, including the transcripts 
of the hearings when the plea was entered and, later, when 
withdrawal was sought. We have also considered the arguments 
of counsel in the partys' brief. Succinctly, defendant argues 
that the plea was not entered in compliance with Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(5); State vt Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); and 
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988). Sfifi 
AlJ5£, State vt PharriS, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36-7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); and State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Both parties are well acquainted with the facts 
surrounding the entry of the plea. A detailed recitation of 
those relevant facts here is unnecessary. It is sufficient to 
observe that the State continues to disagree with this court's 
implementation of Rule 11(5) and State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 
1312-13. We follow our rejection of a "record as a whole" 
approach, as we have discussed in the previously cited cases. 
We find that the trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty 
plea failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule 
11(5) and with State vt Gibbons. 
Although in this case the trial court's examination of 
defendant at the time his guilty plea was entered was more 
lengthy than the examination in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 
1334, that questioning was not sufficiently detailed regarding 
defendant's understanding of his specific Rule 11(5) rights. 
The trial court failed to review with defendant both his 
statements in the affidavit and the rights enumerated in Rule 
11(5). Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. As we stated in State v. 
Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, the failure to make any 
inquiry as to the specific rights detailed in Rule 11(5) cannot 
be "cured" by their mere inclusion in an affidavit alone. 
Consequently, the inadequate examination of defendant was plain 
error. Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-2 (1969). 
We are mindful of the State's arguments and of the trial 
court's comments on the record regarding their concerns as to 
the practical consequences that a strict application of Rule 
11(5) and State v. Gibbons require. VasilaCQPUlPS/ 776 P.2d at 
1334. "The procedure may take additional time, but 
constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name of 
judicial economy." Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 1314. We will 
continue to adhere to the above established precedent, until 
such time as the Utah Supreme Court determines otherwise. 
The state also argues that State v. Kay. 717 P.2d 1294, 
1301-2 (Utah 1986) holds that a rule 11 error does not 
invalidate a plea unless the error resulted in a "substantial" 
violation of a party's right and that this pre-Gibbons holding 
was not expressly overruled by Gibbons. We reject any notion 
that Kay is "controlling" authority here. Kay involved a 
challenge to portions of Rule 11 that are not at issue here — 
namely a trial judge's participation in and adherence to a plea 
bargain agreement between the state and an accused. 1£. at 
1296. That case did not involve the validity of a waiver of 
the substantial rights secured to an accused by statute and 
constitution. In Kay, the state, and not the accused, argued 
that a trial court's technical violation of Rule 11 would 
invalidate a conditional plea bargain arrangement. i£. at 
1300. Also, we do not view State v. Gibbons to be inharmonious 
with State v. Kay because an uninformed and unknowing waiver of 
defendant's constitutional rights would be a ••substantial" 
violation under Kav. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-3; Accord 
Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242-4 (An accused's right to 
trial by jury, right to confrontation, and against 
self-incrimination are "important" constitutional rights and 
their waiver must be knowing, intelligent and on the record). 
Denial of defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea 
is reversed. The case is remanded to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea and, if appropriate, proceed to trial. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Grego Orme, Judge 
j2U}£>Ct tO*t£b>*As 
Russe l l W. Bench, Judge 
